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ARTICLE
GETTING GOVERNMENT OFF THE BACKS
OF PEOPLE: THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE




Justice William 0. Douglas was a character of many iro-
nies and apparent contradictions. Although he was a
flamboyant public personnage, Douglas was personally shy
and insecure. A great champion of human rights, Douglas was
reportedly often harsh and autocratic toward his famnily and
office staff.1 Among the most puzzling areas of apparent in-
consistencies in Douglas' legal writing is his defense of indi-
vidual privacy, simultaneously with his insistence on a nearly
absolute freedom of expression. Because free expression, espe-
cially by the media, frequently interferes with individual pri-
vacy, Douglas seemed to be caught in a dilemma, unable fully
to protect one individual right without infringing thE other.
Any reconciliation of the various aspects of Douglas' legal
views must begin with the recognition that Douglas was a
restless man who relished surprises and enjoyed odd Juxtapo-
sitions. Moreover, coming out of the tradition of legal realism,
he resisted structuring and systematizing legal doctrine. At
the beginning of the first volume of his autobiography, Go
East Young Man, Douglas placed as an epigraph: "All your
anxiety is because of your desire for harmony. Seek dishar-
o 1981 by Dorothy J. Glancy
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1. See J. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY 2, 229-32, 282, 287, 370-82 (1980).
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mony; then you will gain peace."2 Such caveats about Douglas'
self-conscious inconsistency may even have fooled Ronald
Dworkin into characterizing Douglas as possibly "a man with
a guilty secret, a judge of incompatible philosophical convic-
tions posing, mainly to himself, as a fraud."4
Although the purpose of this article is not to refute Dwor-
kin, this analysis of Douglas' notions of the rights to privacy
and free expression does offer an interesting counter example
to the conclusion, which Dworkin shares with other Douglas
critics, that Douglas' views amounted to, in Dworkin's words,
"a kind of theoretical schizophrenia. '" Although Douglas did
not subscribe to Dworkin's rights thesis,' or any other highly
structured analytic doctrine, there is a legal theory which un-
derlies and ties together his opinions regarding the rights of
privacy and freedom of expression. That legal doctrine is
Douglas' conception of the individual's more general right to
be let alone. What Douglas meant by the right to be let alone
is perhaps best communicated by a characteristic phrase, al-
most a battlecry, which Douglas shared with another promi-
nent American: "keep the government off the backs of the
people."'7 Aside from the phrase, Ronald Reagan and William
0. Douglas appear to have shared relatively few common
2. W. 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN vii (1974).
3. Douglas was part of the tradition of legal realism which rejected classical sys-
tematization of legal rules and of Holmes who insisted that "the life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience." 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
Douglas also was a disciple of Emerson and the kind of self-reliance which urges the
individual to define and re-define his or her own personality, irrespective of society's
pressures to conform: "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds" R. W.
EMERSON, SELF-RELIANCE IN ESSAYS 14 (Riverside ed. 1880). Douglas seems to have
taken Emerson's advice to heart.
4. Dworkin, Dissent on Douglas, N. Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Feb. 19, 1981, at 3-8.
5. Id. at 4. See also Note, Toward a Constitutional Theory of Individuality:
The Privacy Opinions of Justice Douglas, 87 YALE L.J. 1579 (1978).
6. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
7. Douglas was apparently the first U.S. jurist to use the phrase in a legal opin-
ion. He used it in roughly half a dozen opinions, beginning in the late 1960's: W.E.B.
DuBois Clubs of America v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309, 318 (1967); Schneider v. Smith, 390
U.S. 17, 25 (1968) (dissenting); Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S.
1042, 1044 (1972) (dissenting); Russol v. Byrne, 409 U.S. 1013, 1017 (1972) (dissent-
ing); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 162
(1973) (concurring in judgment). Even earlier, dissenting in one of the civil rights
removal cases, City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966), Douglas foreshad-
owed the phrase when he wrote that the federal removal statute was intended to take
the burden of defending state court prosecutions "off the backs of this persecuted




II. RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE
When, in 1952, Douglas asserted that "the right tD be let
alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom,"' he had a par-
ticular notion of the right to be let alone in mind. Douglas
.frequently used "the right to be let alone" interchingably
with the right of privacy to refer to aspects of persona] liberty
which are protected by the Constitution from government in-
terference. Douglas' right to be let alone was, thus, not a right
against interferences by the world in general, but a constitu-
tional right against interference by government. Douglas first
made this point about the right to be let alone as an aipect of
"liberty" protected by the due process guarantees of the fifth
amendment in his dissent in Public Utilities Commi.sion v.
Pollack.9 That was in 1952. Later, he made precisely the same
point in describing the penumbral rights or emanation3 which
give content to the liberty protected by the fourteenth mnend-
ment against deprivation without due process by state govern-
ment.10 Toward the end of his judicial career, Douglas de-
scribed the right to be let alone, or right of privacy, as being
based on "customary, traditional, and time-honored rights,
amenities, privileges, and immunities that come within the
sweep of 'the Blessings of Liberty' mentioned in the preamble
to the Constitution . . . . [and] come within the meaning of
the term 'liberty' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment." 1 In
8. Pub. Util. Comm'n. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (dissenting).
9. Id.
In his dissent, Douglas stated that:
The case comes down to the meaning of 'liberty' as used in the Fifth
Amendment. Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than
freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privaicy
as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let aloni is
indeed the beginning of all freedom.
Id. at 467.
10. Douglas argued, again in dissent:
As I indicated in my dissent in Public Utilities Comm'n v. Polak, 'lib-
erty' within the purview of the Fifth Amendment includes the right of
'privacy,' a right I thought infringed in that case because a member of a
'captive audience' was forced to listen to a government sponsored raio
program. 'Liberty' is a conception that sometimes gains content from
the emanations of other specific guarantees or from experience with the
requirements of a free society.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (dissenting).
11. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210-11 (1973) (concurring).
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each instance Douglas' focus was on the government, federal,
state or sometimes local, and on keeping it off the backs of the
people.
It is interesting to note that government interferences
were not the original focus of either the right to be let alone
or the right to privacy. In 1879 Thomas Cooley wrote about
the right to be let alone as a tort right of personal security
against one's fellow citizens, not against the government.12
Cooley, however, was primarily interested in physical security
and, moreover, did not mention a right to privacy. It was not
until 1890, some eight years before William 0. Douglas was
born, that a law review article first argued that one aspect of
the individual's more general right to be let alone was the
right to privacy. This original right to privacy was aimed pri-
marily at combatting unwanted newspaper gossip about peo-
ples' private lives."' The main author of that law review arti-
cle was Louis D. Brandeis, who four decades later as a Justice
of the U.S. Supreme Court, argued that the right to privacy
should also apply against government interferences with the
individual's "right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.""
When Brandeis retired, Franklin Roosevelt chose William
0. Douglas to fill his seat on the U.S. Supreme Court, appar-
ently at the suggestion of Brandeis himself." Douglas consid-
ered himself ideologically close to Brandeis, whom Douglas
described as "a revolutionary symbol . . . [who] wanted to
put the individual and the individual's privacy first, and to
establish only the controls that would keep the individual
from being regimented.""' In the first volume of his autobiog-
raphy, Douglas notes that, beginning in 1934, he visited with
Brandeis "about once a week."' 7 Douglas' views about the
right of privacy, like his seat on the U.S. Supreme Court, were
at least partially the legacy of Louis D. Brandeis.
As do most legatees, Douglas transformed his inheritance
12. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS: OR THE WRONGS WHICH
ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (1879).
13. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890).
See Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1979).
14. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
15. J. SIMON, supra note 1, at 189-91; W.O. DOUGLAS, supra note 2, at 449.
16. W.O. DOUGLAS, supra note 2, at 448-49.
17. Id. at 442.
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and placed his own distinctive mark upon it. Douglas referred
to a right of privacy instead of a right to privacy ais Brandeis
had. Moreover, Douglas focused his right of privacy on keep-
ing only the government, not private gossip-mongers, off the
backs of the people. Most importantly, he expounded a new
and complex theoretical basis for a constitutional right of pri-
vacy against governmental interferences. Instead of a one-di-
mensional, single-focused constitutional right, Douglas envi-
sioned the right of privacy as a collection, or in his words " a
congeries of these rights."18 He described the right of privacy
as an umbrella concept, or principle, which like a ,ihadow or
aura, "emanates from the totality of the constitutional scheme
under which we live."19
In his essay Privacy: One Concept or Many, Paul Freund
described this type of legal concept as a legal principle rather
than a legal rule.20 Douglas saw the constitutional principle of
an individual's right of privacy, or right to be let alone by the
government, as embodied in a number of specific legal rules,
protecting in different ways various "zones of privacy."' To-
ward the end of his judicial career, Douglas described these
zones of privacy as if they were literally three concentric cir-
cles around the individual. Each circle protected different as-
pects of the individual's life against government interferences.
As one moves outward from Douglas' central focus on the in-
dividual's conscience and beliefs, to her body, to her home
and family, and to her freedom to move out into the world,
her right to be let alone diminishes and reasonable govern-
ment regulation becomes more constitutionally tA)lerable."
Sometimes, Douglas' right to be let alone appears to be a crea-
tion of mirrors; various parts of the Constitution both explic-
itly and implicitly project the principle of the right of privacy.
In turn this principle reflects back particular expresm and im-
plied rights against government interference.2 Daz2ling as it
18. W.O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 87 (1958).
19. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (dissenting).
20. Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many, [1971] Y.B. AM. Soc. FDR POLITICAL
AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 182.
21. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965).
22. See text accompanying notes 78-97 infra.
23. One is reminded of William James' description of the technique that his
brother, Henry James used in writing novels as not:
naming it straight, but by dint of breathing and sighing all round and
round it, to arouse in the reader who may have had a similar perc.-ption
1981] 1051
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may seem, Douglas' theory was but an elaboration of enlight-
enment and nineteenth century notions of limited govern-
ment, popularized by Jefferson and Madison in the Federalist
Papers and by Thomas Cooley in his treatises on Constitu-
tional Limitations.2 4
III. THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE
One of Douglas' earliest and most interesting explana-
tions of his views about the right to be let alone appeared in a
series of lectures which he delivered in 1957 and later pub-
lished as a book, The Right of the People. In the shadow of
the McCarthy witch-hunts for supposed Communists, Douglas
insisted, as he had earlier in his dissent in Public Utilities
Commission v. Pollak,15 that individuals have a constitutional
right of privacy which requires the government to let them
alone. His very first sentence regarding "the right to be let
alone" asserted "[g]overnment exists for man, not man for
government." 6 The right of privacy, Douglas asserted, pro-
vides the individual with "protection from government it-
self-from the executive branch, from the legislative branch,
and even from the tyranny of judges. '27 This protection is
based on essential liberties, which are
sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit in the Consti-
tution ... [which] ... have a broad base in morality and
religion to protect man, his individuality, and his con-
science against direct and indirect interference by govern-
ment .... [T]he penumbra of the Bill of Rights reflects
human rights which, though not explicit, are implied from
the very nature of man as a child of God.25
According to Douglas:
already ... the illusion of a solid object, made ... wholly out of impal-
pable materials, air, and the prismatic interference of light, ingeniously
focused by mirrors upon empty space.
Letter from William James to his brother Henry James (May 4, 1907), reprinted in 2
THE LETTERS OF WILLIAM JAMES 277 (2d ed. 1920).
24. A. HAMILTON, J. JAY, & J. MADISON, THE FEDERALIST (1888); T. COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1874).
25. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
26. W.O. DOUGLAS, supra note 18, at 87.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 87-90.
1052 [Vol. 21
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS
Much of this liberty of which we boast comes down to the
right of privacy. It is reflected in the folklore, which goes
back at least as far as Sir William Staunford, that 'my
house is to me as my castle.' But this right of privacy ex-
tends to the right to be let alone in one's belief and in
one's conscience, as well as in one's home.2
Later, in his opinion for the Court in Griswold, 1o Douglas
articulated this same idea:
[SIpecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penum-
bras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance. . . .Various guaran-
tees create zones of privacy. The right of association con-
tained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is
one .... The Third Amendment in its prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of
peace without the consent of the owner is another faoet of
privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly aflirmii the
'right of the people to be secure in their persons, hcuses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enu-
meration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.'81
Similarly, in his concurrence in Doe v. Bolton,8' Douglas
described "a catalogue of these rights""3 against government
interferences with the individual's general right to be let
alone. He arranged these specific rights into three tiers of cat-
egories, beginning with the most important:
First is the autonomous control over the development
and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and
personality.
These are rights protected by the First Amendment
and, in my view, they are absolute, permitting o1! no
exceptions. ...
Second is freedom of choice in the basic decision of
29. Id. at 90.
30. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
31. Id. at 484-85.
32. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
33. Id. at 210.
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one's life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, con-
traception, and the education and upbringing of children.
These rights, unlike those protected by the First
Amendment, are subject to some control by the police
power. Thus, the Fourth Amendment speaks only of 'un-
reasonable searches and seizures' and of 'probable cause.'
These rights are 'fundamental,' and we have held that in
order to support legislative action the statute must be
narrowly and precisely drawn and that a 'compelling state
interest' must be shown in support of the
limitations ...
Third is the freedom to care for one's health and per-
son, freedom' from bodily restraint or compulsion, free-
dom to walk, stroll, or loaf.
These rights, though fundamental, are likewise sub-
ject to regulation on a showing of 'compelling state
interest.'34
To Douglas, these categories of specific individual liberties
were variously protected aspects of the right of individuals to
be let alone by the government. He frequently called this gen-
eral right to be let alone the "right of privacy. 35
IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
An absolute right to free expression headed Douglas' cat-
alogue of the specific rights within the right to be let alone.
Under the first amendment, each individual's right to be let
alone in "the development and expression of one's intellect,
interests, tastes, and personality [is] absolute, permitting of
no exceptions." ' Douglas argued that in a democracy, self
government requires that the exchange of information and
ideas must be absolutely free from government intervention.
Douglas' ideas about free expression were derived in part from
the philosphy of Alexander Meiklejohn who published his
seminal book, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self Govern-
ment, in 1948.87 But Douglas also reached back to Jeffer-
34. Id. at 211-13 (original emphasis omitted).
35. Id. at 213.
36. Id. at 211.
37. See also T. I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970), a
book which developed the Meicklejohn-Douglas doctrine of an absolute freedom of
expression. Thomas Emerson had been a student of Douglas at the Yale Law School
and was often quoted in Douglas' later First Amendment opinions. See generally
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245. See also
1054 [Vol. 21
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son38 and Madison, 9 as well as to Mill's familiar argument for
a free trade in ideas.'0 Douglas' characteristically strong views
regarding free expression gradually evolved during his almost
four decades on the Supreme Court. The longer he served on
the Court, the stronger these views became.
A former law clerk to Justice Douglas has alreEidy chroni-
cled the evolution of Douglas' belief in an absolute right to
freedom of expression.4" There is no need to do that here. It
does bear pointing out, however, that Douglas did not begin
his tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court with the absolutist
views about the first amendment for which he later became
famous. Powe describes three general phases. When Douglas
first joined the Court in 1939, he acquiesced to sorae govern-
ment regulation of expression in cases such as the one which
involved mail fraud prosecutions of members of a religious
sect."' After World War II, Douglas began to insist on a "clear
and present danger"'3 before expression could be restricted,
regulated, or punished. But he nevertheless admitted that
"the freedom to speak is not absolute.'" Finally, in the late
1950's, beginning with decisions concerning censorship of ob-
scenity, Douglas took the position that "the First Amendment
CHAFFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY (1956).
38. "Truth is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error. . . .[Vi]ere it left to
me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspa-
pers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefir the latter."
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), quoted
in W.O. DOUGLAS, supra note 18, at 20.
39. "A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of ac-
quiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will
forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own gorernors, must
arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." Letter from James Madison
to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 276 (1884), quoted in W.O. DOUGLAS, supra note 18, at 19-20.
40. [T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it
is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation;
those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If
the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging
error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a bene st, the
clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by iti colli-
sion with error.
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 35-36 (7th ed. 1871) (1st ed. London 1859), quoted in W.O.
DOUGLAS, supra note 18, at 24.
41. Powe, Evolution to Absolutism: Justice Douglas and the First Amendment,
74 COLUM. L. REV. 371 (1974).
42. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
43. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 585 (1950) (dissenting).
44. Id. at 581.
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puts speech in a preferred position."' 45 Conduct can be regu-
lated and punished. The expression of ideas, however, is not
subject to government control of any kind. Douglas asserted
that unless expression "is so closely brigaded with illegal ac-
tion as to be an inseparable part"46 of that illegal conduct, the
government must keep its hands, as well as its laws and its
law enforcers, off. In these views, Douglas joined Justice Black
in arguing that the words "no law" in the first amendment
literally mean no law. 47 In other words, the individual's right
to be let alone by the government, at least in regard to free
expression, is absolute.
It was actually in a series of free expression cases, decided
in the 1960's, that Douglas first popularized the slogan: "[G]et
the government off the backs of the people."4 8 In these cases,
Douglas insisted that the first amendment was a Constitu-
tional barrier against any government interference with ex-
pression. On one occasion, Douglas graphically described the
government as eagerly climbing on the backs of the media.
The only protection for the media was the Constitution's pro-
hibition of such governmental media-riding.49 Concurring in
the Supreme Court's judgment that the Democratic National
Committee could not use regulations under the Federal Com-
munications Act to force broadcasters to give the Committee
equal air time, Douglas decried the Fairness Doctrine as an
attempt to put "a federal saddle on broadcast licensees."50 He
insisted that the first amendment announces "one hard and
fast principle.., that the Government shall keep its hands off
of the press."51
At one time or another Douglas applied this laissez-faire
first amendment principle to all types of expressive activities
including, not only publishing, speaking, and receiving ideas,
but also association and religion. Douglas described at least
45. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (dissenting).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141-44 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S..399, 412-16 (1958) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
48. See cases cited note 7 supra.
49. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
163 (1973) (concurring in judgment).
50. Id. at 164.
51. Id. at 161-62.
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four types of prohibited government interferencs with free
expression. Government cannot: censor expression in advance;
punish expression after it has occurred; affirmatively require
expression; nor force people to receive particular government-
sponsored expression. Douglas' opinions regarding these four
types of prohibited government interferences with expression
are legion.
Douglas believed that government prohibitioris of expres-
sion are particularly offensive to the first amendment.52 Per-
haps the most celebrated recent case enforcing the constitu-
tional ban on government censorship or prior reA:traints was
the Pentagon Papers case. In that case, the Court dtruck down
the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent publication of
certain secret government analyses of the Vietiam War.58
Douglas concurred, stating his view that the first amendment
leaves "no room for governmental restraint on thi press.""
Douglas also took the position that punishing: expression
was tantamount to prohibiting it. In his view, because crimi-
nal or civil penalties tend to deter expression, punishment of
expression violates first amendment rights just is much as
prior restraints. Although dangerous conduct involving ex-
pression, which Douglas called "speech brigaded with ac-
tion,"55 might be punished, expression alone is absolutely pro-
tected against any sanctions." Douglas wrote many opinions
in this area. One of the most famous was Terminello v. Chi-
cago,57 in which the Court overturned a public speaker's con-
viction for breach of the peace. The substance of the speaker's
crime was referring to a howling mob outside the auditorium
as "slimy scum," "snakes" and "bedbugs."5 8 No matter how
offensive a speaker's words, Douglas wrote, "a function of free
speech under our system of government is to invite dispute." 9
Even ugly and obnoxious speech is absolutely "protected
against censorship or punishment."" He made similar argu-
52. See T.I. EMERSON, supra note 31; L. LEVY, THE LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION
(1960).
53. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
54. Id. at 720 (concurring).
55. E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (dissenting).
56. Id.
57. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
58. Id. at 17-21.
59. Id. at 4.
60. Id. See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37-47 (1973) (dilisenting); Paris
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ments in both obscenity cases"' and several cases which in-
volved punishing communists and ex-communists by denying
them tax exemptions62 or jobs in the merchant marine. 3 Ex-
pression, especially expression which is independent of dan-
gerous conduct, should be free from governmental interfer-
ence; for Douglas this principle applied equally to punishment
and prior restraints.
Douglas likewise argued that under the first amendment,
people cannot be punished for joining together to express and
to exchange views. In The Right of the People, Douglas
explained:
[J]oining is an innate American habit. It is a method of
expression-an assertion of First Amendment rights. One
joins to identify himself with certain objects of the group
or to find a hospitable climate of opinion for the pursuit
of ideas....
One who fears retaliation for associating with groups,
seemingly innocent and lawful, will confine himself to
more orthodox activities. Under that climate of opinion
the free spirit so necessary for research and teaching is
greatly limited.
4
In those opinions where he objected to investigations aimed at
exposing suspected subversive groups, Douglas asserted that
the government had no power to investigate groups and as-
sociations, because such investigations infringe on freedom of
expression by exposing, and thereby discouraging, people's as-
sociations. 5 Douglas was particularly outraged by the Army's
surveillance of civilian gatherings to oppose the Viet Nam war
because such surveillance was "at war with the principles of
the First Amendment."66 He described this Army surveillance,
which had the effect of chilling free expression, as "a cancer in
our body politic.' 7 Douglas insisted that the First Amend-
Adult Theater I v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 70-73 (1973) (dissenting) J. SIMON, supra
note 1, at 434.
61. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508-14 (1957).
62. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 532-38 (1958) (concurring).
63. See, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 24-27 (1968).
64. W.O. DOUGLAS, supra note 18, at 133-34.
65. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 559-76 (1963)
(concurring).
66. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 28 (1972) (dissenting).
67. Id. Less than a year later, John Dean echoed this phrase in describing the
Watergate cover-up to then-President Nixon as a "cancer on the presidency." Con-
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ment forbade the government from prohibiting, punishing, or
exposing people's associations and expressions because any
government action in this area discourages the free expression
which, to Douglas, was at the core of our democratic system of
self-government."
As a logical corollary to the Constitution's absolute prohi-
bition of government abridgement of free expression, Douglas
believed that the government could not affirmatively require
expression any more than the government could prohibit, cen-
sor, or punish it. Douglas' committment to the right to silence
was the earliest area in which Douglas developed his ideas
about individuals' right to be let alone by the government.
The famous cases involving compulsory flag salutes are typical
of this aspect of Douglas' views. When Douglas first joined the
U.S. Supreme Court, he voted with the majority that the pub-
lic schools could compel students to salute the flag.6 9 But
three years later, Douglas changed his mind. Leaving Justice
Frankfurter in dissent, Douglas joined a new majority holding,
in Barnette, 70 that compelling expression contrary to an indi-
vidual's religious principles violates the first amndment.7'
According to Douglas, Frankfurter never forgave Douglas for
his change of heart.7 ' Douglas continued to insist that for gov-
ernment to force individuals to express themselves against
their wills was a particularly obnoxious way for the govern-
ment to fasten itself on the backs of the people. Particularly
in the cases involving what Douglas called "The Despised
Oaths," Douglas insisted that the first amendment forbids the
government from interfering with the individual's right to
keep silent.73
Finally, Douglas believed that the government interferes
versation between John Dean and President Richard Nixon (March 21. 1973). In his
book Blind Ambition, Dean explained that he borrowed the cancer image from Rich-
ard Moore. J. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION 196 (1976). But the image of a canl:er on govern-
ment is remarkably similar to that Douglas used in his Laird v. Tatum fissent issued
less than a year earlier on June 26, 1972.
68. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 28 (1972) (dissenting).
69. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
70. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
71. Id. at 643-44 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring).
72. It appears that after Barnette, Douglas compounded the bad feeling by
sometimes taking a better-civil-libertarian-than-thou attitude toward Frankfurter.
See J. SIMON, supra note 1, at 11-12.
73. W.O. DOUGLAS, supra note 18, at 124. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 532-
38 (1958); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
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with the individual's right to be let alone when it forces peo-
ple to listen to government-sponsored expression. Not only by
censorship, but by forced propaganda, government intrudes
on the right to receive whatever ideas one chooses. Douglas
first developed these ideas in his famous dissent in Public
Utilities Commission v. Pollak.74That case involved the li-
censing of public busses in the District of Columbia to broad-
cast music and news from a local radio station .7 An unwilling
listener argued that any regulation allowing the bus company
to force passengers to listen was invalid. The U. S. Supreme
Court upheld the broadcasts. 76 In his dissent, Douglas re-
minded the Court:
The right to be let alone is the beginning of all free-
dom .... If we remembered this lesson taught by the
First Amendment, I do not believe we would construe
'liberty' within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment as
narrowly as the Court does. The present case involves a
form of coercion to make people listen.77
Although Justice Douglas' views regarding constitutional
doctrines of freedom of expression did change and harden
over the course of his long judicial career, his insistence on
individual self-reliance and independence of belief and con-
science never seemed to waver. Gradually Douglas came to see
that if individuals were to maintain their essential indepen-
dence, the government would have to be required to leave
them alone, particularly in the areas of forming and expres-
sing opinions and beliefs. From the beginning, Douglas held
that unreasonable government regulation of expression is al-
ways impermissible. Later, Douglas came to see that even rea-
sonable government regulation of expression tends to interfere
with and endanger the free exchange of ideas. So he tightened
the constitutional standard in requiring the government to es-
tablish that expression poses a clear and present danger
before that expression could be regulated or punished. Travels
in totalitarian countries and the dark days of the McCarthy
Communist hunts seem to have brought home to Douglas that
74. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
75. Id. at 467-69 (dissenting).
76. Id. at 465. Justice Frankfurter excused himself; he explained that he did so
because "my feelings are so strongly engaged as a victim of the practice in contro-
versy that I had better not participate in judicial judgment upon it." Id. at 467.
77. Id. at 467-68 (dissenting).
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it was dangerous for government to have even a limited power
to regulate expression. Thus, Douglas came to believe that the
only way to protect independent judgment was to outlaw any
government interference with expression. Douglas eventually
concluded that Justice Black was right, and that "no law"
meant no law. This meant that the government must abso-
lutely let the people alone in what they thought, read, heard,
said, and published.
V. BALANCING PRIVACY
Douglas' insistence on an absolute first amendment right
of free expression constituted a central part of his more gen-
eral conception of the right to be let alone-the Corstitution's
command that the government keep off the backs of the peo-
ple. However, aspects of the right to be let alone which were
outside first amendment protection were not absolute. Against
these non-first amendment aspects of the individualt's right of
privacy, Douglas was willing to balance other important gov-
ernment interests. Nevertheless, any government regulation of
even these nonabsolute aspects of the right to privacy should
in his views, be both narrowly and precisely drawn and justi-
fied by compelling state interests."'
Douglas contemplated at least two general types of non-
first amendment, and therefore nonabsolute, protections for
the individual's right of privacy, or right to be let alone by the
government. He. saw some areas of individual privacy as
nearly absolutely protected; this would include those rights
associated with individual choices about marriage, sex, and
the family. Douglas believed that it was extremely important
to protect these intimate relationships, perhaps because they
provide an essential environment for the development of indi-
vidual personality, belief and expression. The sanctuary of the
home was particularly important to Douglas. 9
Outside of these intimate areas, where one's expectation
of privacy is strongest, Douglas found a more generalized con-
78. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (concurring). Brandeis had origi-
nally described the right to privacy as just such a nonabsolute part of a more general
right to be let alone. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13.
79. It is interesting to note, however, that even the home remains subject to
government intrusion, provided the government plays by the rules established in the
fourth amendment, i.e., goes to an independent magistrate and establishes probable
cause to secure a warrant particularly describing the limits of the search.
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stitutional right to be let alone, free from unreasonable gov-
ernment restraint or compulsion. For example, Douglas ar-
gued that the right to travel was part of the individual's
general right to be let alone by the government. That meant
that before regulating such aspects of one's private life, the
government must show "a compelling state interest."80 As one
moves out from Douglas' central focus on the individual's per-
sonality and conscience, to her bodily integrity, to her rela-
tionships with her spouse and family, to her home, to other
areas she expects to be private, to her activities generally, the
individual's right of privacy, or right to be let alone by the
government, gradually diminishes."'
It is interesting to place some of Douglas' opinions along
this privacy continuum. In some out-in-the-open circum-
stances there is no privacy interest involved at all. One of
Douglas' shortest majority opinions, as well as a rare Douglas
opinion for a unanimous Court, involved an air pollution
cease-and-desist order based on smoke plumes observed and
measured by an inspector who, without a warrant, went on the
premises of an animal feed processor. Applying what Holmes
had earlier called the "open fields" exception to the fourth
amendment's privacy protections, 2 Douglas found no privacy
right in such publicly observable business activities. Similarly,
Douglas found no privacy or other constitutionally protected
interests infringed by a small town's zoning ordinances which
forbade more than two unrelated people from living to-
gether.88 Perhaps because of Douglas' strong beliefs that the
environment must be preserved, he decided that the village's
interests in saving its small-town environment outweighed any
privacy interests of students who wanted to live together in
group homes or communes.84
80. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 211.
81. One of Douglas' law clerks, who not only later went on to write such books
as The Greening of America and The Sorcerer of Bolinas Beach, but also helped
Douglas to decide to retire from the Supreme Court, developed this idea of concentric
circles of privacy in his famous article, Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733
(1964).
82. Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865
(1974).
83. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
84. In dissent, Justice Marshall vigorously argued that Douglas' opinion for the
majority had not properly weighed the privacy interests of the college students chal-
lenging the ordinance when Douglas balanced the students' right to live together
against the town's interests in preserving its small town environment. Id. at 13-16.
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On the other hand, Douglas argued that bank customers
do "have a Constitutionally justifiable expectation of privacy
in the documentary details of the financial transactions re-
flected in their bank accounts. 8 5 In his dissent in California
Bankers Association v. Schultz,86 Douglas argued that al-
though the Constitution does not absolutely wall off one's pri-
vate financial records from the government, the government is
required to follow proper warrant procedures and demon-
strate a compelling state interest. Similarly, Douglas wrote, in
a case involving a welfare mother's refusal to let welfare in-
spectors enter her home without a warrant, that: "Isolation is
not a Constitutional guarantee; but the sanctity of the sanctu-
ary of the home is such-as marked and defined by the
Fourth Amendment. 8 7 Disagreeing with the majority of the
Court, Douglas argued that the fourth amendment requires
that any intrusion into the privacy of the welfare mother's
home be justified by probable cause and be accompanied by a
warrant issued by a magistrate. The government could not pe-
nalize the welfare mother by cutting off her welfare benefits
simply because she exercised her privacy right and refused to
allow inspectors to enter her home without a warrant. The
government could not "buy up" her constitutional right to be
let alone in the privacy of her home by conditioning her wel-
fare benefits on the surrender of her right of privacy. After all,
Douglas argued, privacy "is as important to the lowly as to the
mighty."88
The intimacy of the marriage relationship was for Doug-
las even more important than the privacy of the home. Argu-
ing that laws outlawing the use of contraceptives almost liter-
ally reached "into the intimacies of the marriage
relationship,"'" Douglas asserted that any enforcement of
such laws could "reach the point where search warrants issued
and officers appeared in bedrooms to find out what went
on.' ' 90 The bodily integrity involved in abortion cases was even
more intimate than the marriage relationship. But Douglas
did not argue that a woman's privacy right to decide whether
85. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 82 (1974) (dissenting).
86. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
87. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 335 (1971) (dissenting).
88. Id. at 333.
89. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 519 (1961) (dissenting).
90. Id. at 520.
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or not to have an abortion is absolute. Douglas asserted that
"The state has interests to protect," ' which might on occa-
sion outweigh the woman's right of privacy.92
Perhaps the easiest of all of the privacy cases for Douglas
was a case involving the dissemination of birth control infor-
mation and devices to unmarried people.' The majority used
an equal protection analysis and held that unmarried people
had just as much right to contraceptive information and
materials as married couples. But Douglas considered the case
to be "a simple First Amendment case' 94 because it was a
prosecution for giving a lecture on birth control. Such "educa-
tional lectures," 9 which incidentally included distributing
samples of contraceptives to the audience, were expression
which must be absolutely protected from government interfer-
ence.' 6 Douglas believed that a person's right to give and to
receive information is even more carefully insulated from the
government than is her body.'7
VI. WHEN PRIVACY AND FREE EXPRESSION COLLIDE
There were only a few cases during Douglas' tenure on
the Supreme Court in which individuals asserted their right to
privacy against invasion of privacy by nongovernmental publi-
cation of information about their private lives. These cases
appeared to pose a classic confrontation between the right of
privacy and freedom of expression-two of Douglas's highest
priorities. Nevertheless, for Douglas, they were easy cases, be-
cause the individuals were not complaining about government
interferences with privacy, Douglas' constitutional conception
of the right of privacy did not apply. His notion of the right of
privacy involved keeping the government, not the news media,
off the backs of the people. His right of privacy was a right to
be let alone by the government, not by the communications
industry.
Of course, even had the right of privacy been involved in
these cases, Douglas believed that privacy could be compro-
91. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 215 (1972) (concurring).
92. Id. at 216.
93. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 455-60 (1972) (concurring).
94. Id. at 455.
95. Id. at 460.
96. Id.
97. See text accompanying notes 26-34 supra.
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mised in the face of other important societal interests. For
Douglas, the single most important societal interest was free
expression. The first amendment absolutely commanded that
the government, including its judicial system, could not
abridge free expression. This meant that the courts were abso-
lutely prohibited from awarding damages for harmful publica-
tions. Concurring in the denial of damages for harmful public-
ity to the father of a murdered rape victim, Douglas insisted
that the first amendment freedom to publish was not subject
to any balancing against other state or individual interests. To
do any balancing at all in such cases would raise "a specter of
liability which must inevitably induce self-censorship by the
media, thereby inhibiting the rough-and-tumble discourse
which the First Amendment so clearly protects."98
Similarly, Douglas dissented from the Supreme Court's
approval of a damage action for invasion of privacy brought
by the family of a man killed in a bridge disaster. The defen-
dants were a newspaper and its reporter who had published a
distorted human-interest feature article about the family.
Douglas asserted that there would have to be a constitutional
amendment before a Court could award damages for such in-
vasions of privacy by publication." Likewise, in the Supreme
Court's first privacy damage action, Time v. Hill,100 Douglas
insisted that the exercise of first amendment rights could
never be subject to any legal liability, regardless of whether
the publications were true or false. After all, Douglas argued,
"a trial is a chancy thing."' 0'
Douglas made a similar point in a very different context
when he concurred with the majority's decision to strike a
Jacksonville City ordinance which restricted the showing of
films involving nudity at drive-in theaters. Although sympa-
thetic to the privacy interests of what he termed "captive
audiences,' 0 2 Douglas argued that these "legitimate inter-
ests" 103 could be balanced. Moreover, such interests could not
justify government censorship of free expression, which is ab-
98. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 501 n.* (1975) (concurring in
judgment).
99. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 255 (1974) (dissenting).
100. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
101. Id. at 402 (concurring).
102. Erzoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 218 (1975) (concurring).
103. Id.
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solutely protected by the first amendment. 104
More often Douglas described the constitutional guaran-
tees of privacy and free expression as working together. Doug-
las dissented when the Supreme Court rejected a first amend-
ment "newsmen's privilege ' 10 5 which would have allowed
reporters to refuse to reveal confidential sources. His dissent-
ing opinion illustrates his view of the way constitutional pro-
tections for privacy and free expression come together to pro-
tect the individual's right to be let alone by the government.
Douglas described news reporters as doubly protected against
government compulsion to reveal their sources. First, just like
anybody else, news reporters have a privacy right to be let
alone. Second, they have a right to keep silent about whatever
information they generate in the course of formulating and
testing their opinions and beliefs. On another level, the first
amendment prohibits any, even indirect, government interfer-
ence with "a steady, robust, unimpeded, and uncensored flow"
of news and information.106 Other aspects of a reporter's pri-
vacy might, just like anybody else's, be balanced against other
important societal interests, but his or her role as a channel of
free expression can not be balanced, chilled, or deterred. "My
belief is that all of the 'balancing' was done by those who
wrote the Bill of Rights. By casting the first amendment in
absolute terms, they repudiated the timid, watered-down,
emasculated versions of the first amendment"107 which would
allow the courts to compel news reporters to reveal their con-
fidential sources.
VII. CONCLUSION
During the course of his long and controversial public life,
Douglas himself was rarely let alone by the news media. But
Douglas seemed to take most of these invasions of his privacy
philosophically. He was a strong-minded person who felt that
he was smart and able to protect himself against invasions of
his privacy by the media. Douglas seemed to believe that, just
as in climbing a mountain or surviving a snow storm, the truly
independent individual will prevail over and gain strength
104. Id.
105. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 674 (1972) (dissenting).
106. Id. at 715 (concurring).
107. Id. at 713.
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through adversity, including privacy invasions by the press.
The government, however, was another matter. The Mc-
Carthy era of the 1950's, as well as Douglas' travels to Russia
and other totalitarian regimes, demonstrated to Douglas that
government can crush even the most independent-minded in-
dividuals by squelching unconventional thought and expres-
sion into a mindless conformity. Douglas devoted his life and
judicial career to insisting that government respect the indi-
vidual's privacy right to be let alone, most especially when it
came to matters of conscience and belief. In other words,
Douglas' life work was trying to make sure the government
kept off the backs of the people.

